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Abstract 
The crisis within the euro area have become frequent during 2010. First was 
the Greek economy to face a default problem of its sovreign debt, in 
November it was Ireland who has been in a serious financial situation at the 
verge of collapse causing difficulties to the euro. In this contribution we focus 
on the Greek crisis and we suggest, through a model of coopetition based 
on game theory and conceived at a macro level, feasible solutions in a 
cooperative perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic 
policies in Germany and Greece, with the aim of improving the position of 
Greece, Germany and the whole euro area, also making a contribution to 
expand the set of macroeconomic policy tools. By means of our general 
analytical framework of coopetition, we show the strategies that could bring 
to feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for Germany and Greece, 
where these feasible solutions aim at offering a win-win outcome for both 
countries, letting them to share the pie fairly within a growth path 
represented by a non-zero sum game. A remarkable analytical result of our 
work consists in the determination of the win-win solution by a new selection 
method on the transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game.  
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2 
Introduction٭. 
 
In the present work we analize the crisis in the euro area and we 
suggest, through a model of coopetition based on game theory and 
conceived at a macro level, feasible solutions in a cooperative 
perspective for the divergent interests which drive the economic 
policies in Germany and Greece, with the object of improving the 
position of Greece, Germany and the whole euro area.  Our model is 
also aimed at making a contribution to expand the set of 
macroeconomic policy tools. 
The work is organized as follows: the first section examines the 
general topic of the crisis in the euro area focusing on the Greek crisis 
and concentrating on the real aspects of the crisis. The second 
section suggests a possible way out to reduce the intra-eurozone 
imbalances through a new macroeconomic tool based on coopetitive 
solutions within a growth path. The third section introduces a game 
theory framework of coopetition. The fourth section provides two 
specific and original models of coopetitive games applied to the 
eurozone context and shows their solutions. Conclusions end up the 
paper. 
 
1. The Euro and the Crisis. 
 
The crisis within the euro area have become frequent during 2010. First was 
the Greek economy to face a default problem of its sovreign debt last spring, 
in November it was Ireland who has been in a serious financial situation at 
the verge of collapse, due mainly to poor quality bank regulation,  causing 
difficulties to the euro. So the eurozone Governments and international  
 
٭ Sections 1. and 2. of this paper are written by D. Schilirò, sections 3 and 4 are 
written by D. Carfì, the Introduction and Conclusions have been drawn by the two 
authors. We wish to thank Giambattista Dagnino, Davide Provenzano and Albert E. 
Steenge for their helpful comments and suggestions. We wish also to thank  
Samantha Pellegrino for the practical realization of figures. 
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institutions are continually trying to solve these problems that create 
instability and jeopardize the very existence of European Monetary Union. 
Many of the countries of the European Monetary Union have accumulated 
large budget  deficit to GDP ratios in 2009,  which are in turn caused by the 
global crisis that since 2008 developed itself in the United States for then  
spreading around the world. 
The global crisis has inevitably burdened the public debt of countries such 
as Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and even Italy, which have found difficult 
to finance their debt in the financial markets, creating a problem of instability 
and cohesion of the European Monetary Union. But this is only one aspect 
of the crisis, the other one, related to the former, is the recession hitting the 
EMU economies, which are suffering of high unemployment, slowing down 
of production, difficulties in exporting, further crisis of the welfare state. 
In this contribution we focus on the Greek crisis, we know that EMU 
Governments and IMF agreed to provide Greece with enough financing to 
cover its refinancing needs for three years, while the Greek government 
commits to an additional tough austerity program. We also know that 
Germany is the country of the euro area which has a large trade surplus with 
Greece and other euro partners, hence strong trade imbalances occur within 
the eurozone economy. 
Germany is the country who has profited most from the euro since the start 
of the European Monetary Union, according to Adam Posen (2010). 
Because the benefits received from the German economy has been possible 
thanks to a cooperative economic system, the main purpose of our paper is 
to explore win-win solutions for Greece and Germany, involving 
improvements in domestic demand in Germany. 
We do not analyze the causes of the financial crisis in Greece and its 
relevant political and institutional effects on the European Monetary Union. 
Rather we focus on some crucial aspects of the Greek economy, with their 
implications on the euro area. Specifically we concentrate on stability and 
growth, which should drive the economic policy of Greece, Germany and the 
other euro countries. 
The deep financial crisis of Greece, which was almost causing the default of 
its sovereign debt, determining also financial instability in the European 
markets and the devaluation of the euro, has revealed the weaknesses of 
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Greek economy. This crisis has also showed the contradictions that have 
been characterized the EMU and the euro since their start1. 
Furthermore, EMU is featured by the presence of two countries, Germany 
and France, which have a major and increasing political and economic role. 
Greece is a country with a total population of 11 million and it represents 
2,6% of the eurozone’s GDP. This country adopted the euro in 2001, then 
interest rates fell to near German levels, the lowest in the euro area, fueling 
consumer spending and house prices. Since joining EMU, Greece has lost 
competitiveness and, because of that, Greek’s unit labor cost rose 34 
percent from 2000 to 2009. Thus, Greece relied on state spending to drive 
growth. With the outbreak of the crisis, debt in Greece has surged as in the 
other countries, but in 2009 Greece recorded a deficit/GDP ratio of 13.6%, 
one of the highest of the eurozone economies. This has created deep 
concerns about its fiscal sustainability. 
Greece has also accumulated a huge debt of about 310 billion euros, thus 
its financial esposition prevents the Greeek government to find capital in the 
financial markets. The country, therefore, has become at risk of sovereign 
default. In the meantime the other EMU countries, after a period of 
uncertainty which raises the cost of the bailout, have decided to help Greece 
financially also with the support of IMF2. This financial contribution is likely to 
be given until 2012 and it will be very substancial3. But tough austerity 
conditions are requested in return for the emergency loans, which are to be 
paid with interest rates below the market rates, the Greek Government is 
required to take courageous and specific actions that will lastingly and 
credibly consolidate the public budget4. The EMU-IMF package also 
                                                
1 One feature of the institutional setting of the European Monetary Union is the Stability and 
Growth Pact that guards against the emergence of public deficits and debt, but actually there 
isn’t a true and effective mechanism of enforcement in the Pact. Therefore the budget policy 
in each country of the eurozone is not under control. Yet the European Commission has, just 
after  the Greek crisis, proposed tougher rules to enforce fiscal discipline in the eurozone and 
to set up a permanent crisis management mechanism to prevent sovereign debt disasters. 
2 An agreement has been reached on May 2nd, between the Eurogroup, the IMF and the 
Greek Government. 
3 The total sum given to Greece in three years should be of 110 billion euros. 
4 First, to recover from the budget disequilibrium, Greece is expected to improve the primary 
balance of 10 percent of GDP over the next three years (This is an heavy task, but other 
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includes measures to enhance competition in many sectors which are still 
protected; thus the country is expected to reduce its budget deficit from 13.6 
per cent of gross domestic product to below 3 per cent by 2014. 
However, although a restrictive fiscal policy and budget austerity are 
necessarily implemented by the Greek Government, they could be 
insufficient for Greece to overcome its crisis. The austerity measures are 
likely to hit hard the Greek economy, since its growth is expected to be 
negative this year and the next year, making the financial recovery even 
more problematic5. Furthermore, exports are much less than imports, so the 
trade balance shows a deficit around 10%. Therefore, the focus of economic 
policy of Greece should be on its productive system and growth must 
become the major goal for the Greek economy. This surely would help its 
reequilibrium process. 
On the other hand, Germany is considerd the soundest European economy. 
First of all, it accounts for about one-third of the eurozone economy. 
Secondly, it is the world’s second biggest exporter, but its wide commercial 
surplus is originated mainly by the exports in the euro area, that accounts for 
about two thirds. Furthermore, since 2000 its export share has gradually 
increased vis-à-vis industrial countries. Thirdly, its government has not 
allowed itself the extraordinary budget deficits that are threatening 
economies like Ireland, Italy, Greece, Portugal and Spain. Despite these 
positive records, the contribution of domestic demand to real GDP from 
1999 onwards in Germany has been weak. It is clear, from such a context, 
that the Germany’s growth path has been driven by exports. We do not 
discuss in this work the factors explaining Germany’s increase in export 
share, but we observe that its international competitiveness has been 
improving, with the unit labor cost which has been kept fairly constant, since 
wages have essentially kept pace with productivity. Therefore the prices of 
                                                                                                    
economies like Lettonia and Hungary have succeded in the recent past  with the help and the 
assistance of the IMF and EU). Moreover, the package includes measures to reduce the size 
of Greece’s public sector, cuts in public sector salaries and pensions, a rise in value added 
tax and other tax increases. 
5 This view, of course, is not shared by the economists who believe that fiscal adjustments 
not always cause recessions (Giavazzi,Pagano, 1990; Von Hagen, Strauch, 2001; Alesina, 
Adagna, 2009). 
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the German products have been relatively cheap, favouring the export of 
German goods towards the euro countries and towards the markets around 
the world, especially those of the emerging economies (China, India, Brasil, 
Russia). Finally, just during 2010 Germany has recovered very well from the 
2008-2009 global crisis and is growing at a higher rate than the others euro 
partners. 
Thus, we share the view that Germany (and the other surplus countries of 
the euro area, i.e. Netherlands) should contribute to overcome the crisis of 
the EMU economies and of Greece in particular stimulating its domestic 
demand and relying less on exports towards the euro area. 
Germany, as Adam Posen (2010) underlined6, has benefited from being the 
anchor economy for the eurozone over the last 11 years. In fact, it enjoyed a 
wider and deep range of trade in the euro currency than it had under the 
Deutch Mark. For instance, in 2009, during a time of global contraction, 
Germany has been a beneficiary, being able to run a sustained trade surplus 
with its European neighbours. Germany exported, in particular, 6.7 billions 
euros worth of goods to Greece, but imported only 1.8 billion euros worth in 
return. 
Clearly a policy which aims at growth in Greece, Germany and the whole 
euro area is very important, specially if we take a medium-long term 
perspective and if we consider that the rate of unemployment in the euro 
area has reached 10.1%7, the highest rate in almost 12 years8 . 
We believe that a policy that aims at adjusting budget and trade imbalances 
and looks at improving the growth path of the real economy in the medium 
and long term in Greece is the only possible one to assure a stable re-
                                                
6 See also Abadi (2010). 
7 Source: Eurostat. The figure refers to April 2010. 
8 Another aspect to highlight is that despite the new huge rescue plan of 750 billion euros 
supported by the EU and IMF to avoid the contagion of the Greeek crisis to the other EMU 
countries, the recent turmoil in the financial markets and the consequent weakening of the 
euro seem to confirm the poorly optimistic expectations of the financial markets on the future 
of the Greek economy. Investors are looking for a credible plan that indicated public finances 
in Greece but also in whole euro area could be kept at a sustainable level. In this context the 
view that a partial debt restructuring by the Greek government might become a sensible and 
realistic solution. 
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balancing of the Greek economy and to contribute to the stability of the euro 
area. As we have already argued, German modest wage increases and 
weak domestic demand favoured the export of German goods towards the 
euro countries. This is why Posen, as reported by Business Week on March 
31, 2010, said that Germany should boost domestic demand and increase 
wages to ease the lopsided euro-region trade flows that restrict growth in 
economies like Greece and Portugal. Therefore he suggests a “win-win 
solution”9 for the EMU countries, which entails that Germany, which still 
represents the leading economy, should stimulate domestic demand, 
increase wages in its own country, so that to make its own people better off, 
and thereby ease some of the pressure on the southern countries of the 
euro area. In Posen’s proposal there is a clear suggestion to Germany to re-
balance its trade surplus. 
Of course, we are aware that this is a mere hypothesis10. Although Germany 
has been pursuing a strategy of competitiveness based on investments in 
technology and R&D on the one hand, and on industrial relations, which are 
featured by cooperative behaviors between labor and capital, on the other 
since 2003. We believe that this cooperative attitude, which is an hallmark of 
German capitalism, can be also taken with respect to its euro partners and 
the Greece in particular. Thus we pursue our hypothesis and suggest a 
game theory coopetitive model as an innovative instrument to analyze 
possibile solutions to obtain a win-win outcome for Greece and Germany, 
which would also help the whole EMU economy. 
Giving that Greece must fulfil the conditions of the agreement signed with 
the eurozone Governments and the IMF for their financial help and, for this 
reason, it must implement a fiscal policy of government budget 
consolidations, with current spending cuts and tax increases, to reduce its 
public and private debt, these changes in current variables (taxes, 
                                                
9 A win-win solution is the outcome of a game which is designed in a way that all participants 
can profit from it in one way or the other. In conflict resolution a win-win strategy is a process 
that aims to accommodate all disputants. 
10 After the Greek crisis, because of the turmoil in the financial markets, the German 
government have decided to take austerity fiscal measures, which consists of a seven years 
plan of government budget consolidations of 70 billion euros (10 billion euros for each year), 
based mainly on structural spending cuts to welfare payments and reduction in the public 
sector. This plan, however, will also favour investment in education and research to improve 
Germany’s capacity to compete at a global level. 
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incentives, provision of public services) would probably also change the 
expectations about future fiscal policy11. In our view, Greece must keep its 
wages and salaries under control and, at the same time, focus on 
investments and exports as the two main strategic variables to improve the 
structure of production and to shift the aggregate demand towards a higher 
growth path. However, aiming at exports for a country like Greece that has a 
low “extra euro area” export share on GDP (about 4%) does not mean to 
rely on the external demand, for instance through the devaluation of the 
euro, rather to follow an appropriate medium term strategy. In this medium 
term strategy, Greece should focus on innovative investments, specially 
investments in knowledge12, to change and improve its production structure 
and to increase its production capacity and its productivity, which is made 
possible by the structural change process. As a result of that its 
competitiveness will raise. An economic policy that focuses on investments 
and exports, instead of consumptions, will address Greece towards a 
sustainable growth and, consequently, its financial reputation and stability 
will get improved. 
 
 
2. A New Tool for Macroeconomic Policy: Coopetitive 
Solutions for the Greek Crisis. 
 
The idea which is driving our model to face the Greek crisis is based on a 
notion of coopetition where the cooperative aspect will prevail. Thus we are 
not talking about a situation in which Germany and Greece are competing in 
the same European market for the same products, rather we are assuming a 
situation in which Germany stimulates its domestic demand and, in doing so, 
will create a larger market for products from abroad, but also we are 
envisaging the case in which Germany purchases a greater quantity of 
                                                
11 Regarding the indirect positive effect on aggregate demand see Hellwig, Neumann ( 1987) 
that merge the Keynesian view and the expectations view or “German view” on budget 
cutting. See also Giavazzi, Pagano (1990). 
12 Schilirò (2010b). 
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Greek products, in this case Greece increases its exports, selling more 
products in Germany. The final results will be that Greece will find in a better 
position, but also Germany will get an economic advantage determined by 
the higher growth in the two countries and, finally, because it will prevail a 
greater stability within the EMU system. Therefore we provide, in the present 
work, a new set of tools based on the notion of coopetition, that could be 
fruitful for the setting of the Greek policy issues.  
The concept of coopetition has been devised following different theoretical 
approaches. Essentially the literature on coopetitive games has a 
microeconomic origin and has an important point of reference in the seminal 
paper of Brandenburger and Nalebuff (1995), who studied the strategic 
behaviour of firms applying some basic notion of game theory and 
elaborated their theoretical original concept of coopetition within a 
competitive environment. Brandenburger and Nalebuff suggest the term 
coopetition (a situation in which the firm must cooperate and compete at the 
same time) to indicate a situation in which the firm thinks about both 
cooperative and competitive ways to change the game (1995, p.59).13 
Another approach to coopetition represents the synthesis between the 
competitive paradigm (Porter, 1985) and the cooperative paradigm (Gulati, 
Nohria, Zaheer, 2000), a sort of integrative framework between the two, like 
that offered by Padula and Dagnino (2007), who define coopetition as the 
intrusion of competitive elements into a cooperative environment, because 
of the partially divergent interests among the partners. Thus coopetition is a 
complex construct and it is the result of the interplay between competition 
and cooperation. 
Our model of coopetition is closer to the approach that regards coopetition 
as a complex construct rooted in a cooperative environment. Thus we 
suggest a model of coopetitive games, applied at a macroeconomic level, 
which intends to offer possible solutions to the partially divergent interests of 
Germany and Greece in a perspective of a cooperative attitude that should 
drive their policies. Another important goal of the model is to provide a new 
tool of macroeconomic policy for the crisis in the euro area, thus enriching 
the toolbox of economic policy. 
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3. The general definition of coopetitive game. 
 
In this section we provide an original recent definition of coopetitive game, 
which we shall use, in the next section, to build up two economic models 
feasible to represent the interaction of the two EMU countries, Germany and 
Greece. The two above coopetitive models will show possible new solutions 
reasonable in a particular coopetitive context, defined by the set of strategy 
profiles at disposal of the two countries and by a set of possible convenient 
ex ante agreements. This suggested analytical framework enables us to 
wide the set of possible solutions from a purely competitive into a coopetitive 
context and moreover it allows “to share the pie fairly” in a win-win scenario. 
At the same time, it permits to examine the range of possible economic 
outcomes along a coopetitive dynamic path. Finally, we propose a rational 
way to limit the space within which the coopetitive solutions can be 
determined. 
 
Remark. The basic original definition we propose and apply of coopetitive 
game is that introduced in 2010 by D. Carfì in [11] and [3]; the method that 
we shall use to study the payoff space of a normal form game can be found 
in [8] and [12]; the complete study of a normal form game is presented and 
applied in [7], [9] and [10]; for a general definition and basic properties of 
Pareto boundaries see [6]. 
 
Definition (of coopetitive game). Let E, F and C be three nonempty sets. 
We define two person coopetitive gain game carried by the strategic 
triple (E, F, C) any pair of the form G = (f, >), where f is a function from the 
Cartesian product E × F × C into the real Cartesian plane R2 and > is the 
usual strict upper order of the Cartesian plane, defined, for every couple of 
points p, q, by p > q if and only if pi > qi, for each index i. 
 
Remark. The difference among a two person normal-form gain game and a 
two person coopetitive gain game is simply the presence of the third strategy 
Cartesian factor C. 
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Terminology and notation. Let G = (f, >) be a two person coopetitive gain 
game carried by the strategic triple (E, F, C). We will use the following 
terminologies: 
 
- the function f is called the payoff function of the game G; 
 
- the first component f1 of the payoff function f is called the payoff function 
of the first player and analogously the second component f2 is called the 
payoff function of the second player; 
 
- the set E is said the strategy set of the first player, the set F the strategy 
set of the second player; 
 
- the set C is said the cooperative strategy set of the two players. 
 
- the Cartesian product E × F × C is called the coopetitive strategy space 
of the game G. 
 
Memento. The first component f1 of the payoff function f of a coopetitive 
game G is the function of the strategy space of the game G into the real line 
defined by f1(x,y,z) = pr1(f(x,y,z)), where pr1 is the usual first projection of the 
Cartesian plane; analogously we proceed for the second component f2. 
 
Strategic interpretation. We have two players, each of them has a strategy 
set in which to choose his own strategy; moreover, the two players can 
cooperatively choose a strategy z in a third set C. The two players will 
choose their cooperative strategy z to maximize (in some sense) the gain 
function f. 
 
Bargaining solutions of a coopetitive game. The payoff function of a two 
player coopetitive game is (as in the case of normal-form game) a vector 
valued function with values belonging to the Cartesian plane R2; so that we 
should consider the maximal Pareto boundary of the payoff space im(f) as 
an appropriate zone for the bargaining solutions (by im(f) we denote the 
image of the function f). 
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The family of normal form games associated with a coopetitive game. 
For any cooperative strategy z, selected in the cooperative strategy space 
C, there is a corresponding normal form game 
 
 Gz = (fz, >) 
 
upon the strategy pair (E, F) and with payoff function the section 
 
 f(. , z) : E × F → R2, 
 
of the payoff function f of the coopetitive game, where the section of f is 
defined, as usual, on the competitive strategy space E × F by 
 
f(., z)(x) = f(x, z), 
 
for every bi-strategy x in the bi-strategy space E × F. 
 
General solution. The two players should choose the cooperative strategy 
z in order that, for instance: 
 
- the Nash equilibria of Gz are “better” than the Nash equilibria in each other 
game Gz’; 
 
- the supremum of Gz is greater than the supremum of any other game Gz’; 
 
- the Pareto maximal boundary of Gz is “higher” than that of any other game 
Gz’; 
 
- the Nash bargaining solution is better in Gz than that in Gz’; 
 
- and so on, fixed a common standard kind of solution for any game Gz, say 
S(z) the set of these kind of solutions, we can consider the problem to find 
the optimal solutions in set valued path S, defined on the cooperative 
strategy set C; 
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we note the fundamental circumstance that in general the above criteria are 
multi-criteria and so they generate multi-criteria optimization problems. 
 
Let us formalize the concept of game-family associated with a coopetitive 
game. 
 
Definition (the family of normal form games associated with a 
coopetitive game). Let G = (f, >) be a two players coopetitive gain game 
carried by the strategic set triple (E, F, C). We call family of normal-form 
games associated with the coopetitive game G the family of normal form 
games 
 
G = (Gz)z∈C, 
 
which we will denote by the symbol G, having, for any cooperative strategy z 
selected in the cooperative strategy space C, as z-member the normal form 
game 
 
 Gz = (fz, >), 
 
upon the strategy pair (E, F), with payoff function the section 
 
 f(. , z) : E × F → R2, 
 
of the payoff function f of the coopetitive game G. 
 
Applicative remark. It is clear that with any family of normal form games 
 
G = (Gz)z∈C 
 
we can associate 
 
- a family of payoff spaces 
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(im(fz))z∈C, 
 
- a family of Pareto maximal boundary 
 
(bd*Gz)z∈C; 
 
- a family of suprema 
 
(sup Gz)z∈C; 
 
and so on.  
 
And we can interpret any of the above families as set-valued paths in the 
strategy space E × F. 
 
It is just the study of these induced set-valued paths of solutions which 
becomes of great interest in the study of a coopetitive game G. 
 
 
4. Two models of coopetitive games 
 
In our analysis Germany is the first exporting country among the EMU 
countries, which has also experienced a weak domestic demand due to a 
modest wage increases. Thus our hypothesis is to stimulate Germany’s 
domestic demand and to re-balance its trade surplus in favour of Greece. 
On the other hand, Greece is the country that showed a high and rising 
public debt, which determined its sovereign debt at risk of default. Given that 
Greece must pursue a budget austerity program externally imposed by the 
euro area Governments and by IMF in exchange of their financial help, this 
country has anyway experienced a declining competitiveness of its products. 
Therefore our hypothesis is that Greece aims at growth by undertaking 
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innovative investments and by increasing its exports primarily towards 
Germany and also towards the other euro countries13. 
The coopetitive models that we propose hereunder must be interpreted as 
normative models, in the sense that they will show the more appropriate 
solutions of a win-win strategy chosen within a cooperative perspective. 
 
The main variables of the two models are: 
 
strategies x of Germany (the consumptions of Germany), which directly 
influence only Germany pay-off; 
 
strategies y of Greece (the investiments of Greece) which increase only 
Greece pay-off function;  
 
a shared strategy z which is determined ex ante together by the two 
countries, Germany and Greece (z is a given amount of Greek exports 
imported by Germany).  
 
Therefore, in the two models we assume that Germany and Greece define 
the set of coopetitive strategies. 
 
4.1 First coopetitive model. 
 
Main Strategic assumptions. We assume that a real number x, in the unit 
interval U = [0,1], is the consumption of Germany and a real number y, in the 
same unit interval U, is the investment of Greece, moreover a real number z, 
again in the unit interval U, is the amount of Greek exports which is imported 
by Germany. 
 
We also consider as payoff function of Germany its domestic demand, that 
we represent in our model as the algebraic sum of the two strategies x and 
z, and also of the exports of Germany as a reaction function with respect to 
                                                
13 The potential benefit coming from a better  trade balance can also contribute to ease the 
government budget constraint and improve its public debt. 
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its domestic consumption. 
 
 
 
4.1.1 Payoff function of Germany 
 
We assume that the payoff function of Germany is the function g of the unit 
square U × U into the real line R, defined by   
 
g(x, z) = x + (x + 1) -1 – z, 
 
for every pair (x,z) in the square U × U; where the reaction function E, of U 
into the real line, defined by 
 
E(x) = 1/(x+1), 
 
for every consumption x of Germany in U, is the export of Germany 
corresponding to the level x of consumption. The reaction function E is a 
decreasing function, randomly chosen, and within certain limits, this choice 
does not diminish the generality of the model. 
 
 
4.1.2 Payoff function of Greece 
 
We consider as payoff function of Greece the algebraic sum of the economic 
strategies y and z and of two linear reaction functions M and N. 
 
We assume that the payoff function of Greece is the function e of the square 
U × U into the real line, defined by   
 
 e(y, z) = y + z + my + nz = (1+m) y + (1+n) z , 
 
for every pair (y, z) in the Cartesian square U × U, where m and n are two 
real numbers strictly greater than 1. We note that the function e does not 
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depend upon the strategy x chosen by Germany and that e is a linear 
function. 
 
Reaction function M. The term my represents the quantitative effect of 
investments on the exports. In fact, the investments, especially innovative 
investments, contribute at improving the competitiveness of Greek goods, 
favoring the exports. 
 
Reaction function N. The term nz is the cross-effect of the coopetitive 
variable z that represents the additive level of investment required to support 
the production of z. 
 
 
4.1.3 Payoff function of the game 
 
We so have build up a gain game with payoff function given by  
 
 p(x,y,z) = (x + 1/(x+1) - z, (1+m) y + z) =  
= (x + 1/(x+1), (1+m) y) + z (-1,1+n), 
 
with x,y,z in the unit interval [0,1]. 
 
 
4.1.4 Study of the game G = (p, >). 
 
Note that, fixed a cooperative strategy z in the unit interval U, the normal 
form game G(z) = (p(z), >) with payoff function p(z), defined on the square 
U2 by 
 
 p(z)(x, y) = p(x, y, z), 
 
is the translation of the game G(0) by the vector 
 
v(z) = z(-1,1+n), 
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so that we can study the game G(0) and then we can translate the various 
informations of the game G(0) by the vector v(z).  
 
 
4.1.5 Study of the game G(0). 
 
So let us consider the game G(0). Let the strategic square S = U2 be with 
vertices A, B, C, D, where A is the origin (0,0), B is the first canonical vector 
(1,0), C = (1,1), the sum of the two canonical vectors, and D be the second 
canonical vector (0,1). 
 
The transformation of the side [A, B] is the trace of the parametric curve c 
defined by 
 
 c(x) = p(x,0,0) = (x + (x+1) -1, 0), 
 
that is the segment 
 
 [A’, B’] = [(1,0), (3/2,0)]. 
 
The transformation of the segment [A, D] is the trace of the curve c defined 
by 
 
 c(y) = p(0,y,0) = (1, (1+m) y), 
 
that is the segment 
 
 [A’, D’] = [(1,0), (1,1+m)]. 
 
The transformation of the segment [B, C] is the trace of the curve c defined 
by 
 
 c(y) = p(1, y ,0) = (1 + 1/2, (1 + m) y), 
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that is the segment 
 
[B’, C’] = [(3/2,0), (3/2,1 + m)]. 
 
So that the payoff space of the game G(0) is the rectangle with vertices A’, 
B’, C’, D’. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The payoff space of the initial game G(0). 
 
 
Remark. It is easily seen that the critical zone of the game is irrelevant (in 
this case) to determine the payoff space of the game. 
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4.1.6 Payoff space of the coopetitive game G.  
 
The image of the payoff function p, is the union of the family of payoff 
spaces 
 
 (im p(z))z , 
 
that is the convex envelope of the of the four points A’, B’, C’, D’ and of their 
translations by the vector 
 
v(1) = (-1,1+n). 
 
The Pareto maximal boundary of the payoff space f(S) is the segment  
 
[P’, Q’], 
 
where P’ = C’ and 
 
Q’ = C’ + v(1) = (3/2, 1+m) + (-1, 1+n) = (1/2, 2 + m + n).  
 
It is important to note that the absolute slope of the coopetitive Pareto 
boundary is the absolute slope of the vector (-1,1+ n), that is the real 
number 
 
abslope(-1,1 + n) = 1 + n, 
 
this real number is strictly greater than 1 since the factor n is strictly positive. 
 
In the following figure we see the payoff space of the coopetitive game G as 
the trace of the path of payoff spaces corresponging to the path of normal 
form games G. This path of payoff spaces is nothing but a path of 
translations of a rectangle, namely the payoff space of the “initial” game 
G(0).  
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Figure 2. The payoff space of the coopetitive game G. 
 
 
Thus the collective payoff function 
 
g + e 
 
of the game is not constant on the coopetitive Pareto boundary and, 
therefore, the game implies possibility of growth, because the minimum 
value of the aggregate payoff g + e is attained exactly at the supremum of 
the game G(0). 
 
 
4.1.7 Compromise solutions and the coopetitive compromise 
 
The Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining 
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solution, with respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary, coincide with 
the medium point of the segment [P’, Q’]14. 
 
Transferable utility solution. In this coopetitive context it is more 
convenient to adopt a transferable utility solution: indeed the point of 
maximum collective gain is the point 
 
Q’ = (1/2, 2 + m + n), 
 
that is the supremum of the game G(1). 
 
Thus we have to propose a new kind of coopetitive compromise solution 
to “share the pie fairly”. 
 
We proceed as it follows (in the case m = 0): 
 
First, we consider the coopetitive rectangle R having: 
 
a) two sides on the straight lines of equations 
 
Y = 1 and Y = 2 + n; 
 
b) two vertices in (1/2, 1) and (1/2, 2 + n); 
 
b) the diagonal on the straight line S of equation 
 
Y + X = 2.5 + n. 
 
                                                
14 The classic Kalai-Smorodinsky solution, that we applied in both models, coincides with the 
solution on the coopetitive Nash path; this result allows us to provide a construct of 
coopetition wich is only “weakly” cooperative, in the sense that it not necessary to cooperate 
at every stage of the decision process. 
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figure 3. The coopetitive bargaining rectangle. 
 
 
 
Second, we consider the segment S’ of vertices (3/2,1) (supremum of the 
game G(0)) and the supremum of  the rectangle R, the point (3/2+n,2+n), 
this segment is the set  
 
 S’ = (3/2,1) + (n,1+n)[0,1]. 
 
Third, our best payoff coopetitive compromise K is the intersection of the 
two segments S and S’. 
 
This compromise payoff K represents a win-win solution with respect to the 
initial supremum (3/2,1), since K is a payoff strongly greater than the initial 
supremum 
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C’ = supG(0). 
 
 
 
figure 4. Coopetitive compromise K. 
 
Remark. In some way, the choices of the coopetitive bargaining interval 
(rectangle) and of the coopetitive solution are the only reasonable. Indeed: 
1) the constraint where we should search for a bargaining solution is 
the transferable utility Pareto boundary (segment of the line with 
equation Y + X = 2.5 + n determined by the positive cone of the 
plane); 
2) the possible bargaining Greece’s outcames should belong to the 
interval [1, 2+n], with end-points the minimum and maximum value 
of the Greece’s payoff function in the coopetitive game; 
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3) points 2 and 3 determine the coopetitive bargaining rectangle; 
4) the solution we propose is nothing but a best compromise solution 
with utopia point the supremum of this rectangle and threat point 
the maximum of the initial game G(0). 
 
4.2 Second coopetitive model 
 
Let us consider now that a fraction ax of Germany consumption comes from 
consumption of Greek goods, apart from the given amount of Greek exports 
that Germany has already determined through an ex ante agreement with 
Greece (z). 
 
Payoff function of Greece 
 
e(x,y,z) = by + z + ax 
 
Payoff function of the game 
 
p(x,y,z)  = (x + 1/(x+1) - z, ax+by + cz) = 
= (x + 1/(x+1), ax+ by) + z (-1, c) 
  
with a, x,y,z in [0,1] and b,c>1. 
 
Similarly to the previous coopetitive model, but through a more complex 
procedure, we deduce that the Pareto boundary of the new coopetitive game 
G = (p, >) – in the payoff space - is the above segment [P’, Q’] translated by 
the vector (0,a). 
 
The Nash bargaining solution and the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining 
solution, with respect to the infimum of the Pareto boundary, coincide with 
the medium point of the segment 
 
 [P’, Q’] + (0,a), 
 
which is the optimum of the game G1/2. 
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Analogously the coopetitive compromise solution of this new game is the 
that of the first model translated by the vector (0,a). 
 
Conclusions 
 
This contribution has tried to provide, through a game theory model of 
coopetition, feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective to the problems 
of Greek economy after its crisis. In particular, it has focused on stability and 
growth as the primary goals, which should drive Greece and Germany 
economic policy with their positive effects on the whole euro area. 
The idea underlying the present work was that of contributing to expand the 
set of macroeconomic policy tools available to face the economic crisis in 
Greece, and more generally in the European Monetary Union, where a 
cooperative attidude should prevail. 
In this work have underlined two aspects which emerged from the crisis. 
First, the necessity of governement budget consolidation of Greece; second, 
the opportunity to re-balance the trade surplus of Germany with respect to 
Greece (and also with respect to the other euro countries that have a deficit 
trade balance). 
By means of two coopetitive models derived by an original general analytical 
framework of coopetition, we have showed the strategies that could bring to 
feasible solutions in a cooperative perspective for Germany and Greece, 
where these feasible solutions aim at offering a win-win outcome for both 
countries, letting them to share the pie fairly within a growth path 
represented by a non-zero sum game. In fact, our anlytical results allow us 
to find a “fair” amount of Greek exports which Germany must import, in order 
to re-balance the trade surplus of Germany, as well as the investments 
necessary to improve the Greek economy, thus contributing to growth and to 
the stability of the Greek economy and, indirectly, of the whole European 
Monetary Union. 
Finally, a remarkable analytical result of our work consists in the 
determination of the win-win solution by a new selection method on the 
transferable utility Pareto boundary of the coopetitive game. 
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